Nuclear Risk Reduction Between India and Pakistan • Stimson Center – Stimson Center

A quarter century since the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan, a fragile nuclear confidence building regime exists between the adversarial neighbors. India and Pakistan negotiated these nuclear confidence building measures (NCBMs) to encourage transparency, build trust, prevent misunderstandings, avoid misinterpretations, and mitigate nuclear risks. However, smooth implementation of NCBMs hinges on both states recognizing the value of trust-building and transparency. Amidst their deteriorated dialogue, there is a risk of complacency in meeting bilateral obligations, potentially leading to the abandonment of agreements. The reversible nature of existing NCBMs and minimal repercussions for either state increase the likelihood of this outcome. Moreover, there are persistent dangers of catastrophic escalation of crises rooted in misperception. India-Pakistan NCBMs regime can play a crucial role in reducing the nuclear risks, provided the crisis communication infrastructure is operational, review and monitoring mechanism is introduced, and the nuclear dialogue is insulated from political stressors.
Nuclear adversaries resort to nuclear confidence-building measures (NCBMs) to promote trust and reduce tensions. NCBMs are essential tools for mitigating the likelihood of accidental or intentional nuclear escalation. Since India and Pakistan nuclearized in 1998, the relationship between the two countries has been characterized by the ever-present threat of a military confrontation escalating to the nuclear level. Both states instituted an NCBM regime through four key agreements. This policy memo raises questions regarding the sufficiency of the existing NCBMs in fostering genuine confidence and trust between the two states. Meaningful confidence-building requires implementing substantive NCBMs with a commitment to genuinely address core concerns, and there is room to strengthen the NCBM regime through more substantive measures and sincere engagement in the underlying issues. In this context, this memo examines the challenges and opportunities in implementing effective NCBMs between India and Pakistan with the goal of reducing nuclear risks in South Asia.
NCBMs refer to a set of actions and policies aimed at promoting trust, transparency, and stability among states that possess nuclear weapons.¹ The main aim of NCBMs is to foster trust and understanding among nuclear-armed states through open dialogue and information-sharing, which helps to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and manage the arms race.² However, NCBMs are largely complementary measures and not substitutes for formal arms control agreements.
India and Pakistan agreed on a framework for nuclear dialogue within a year of nuclear testing. The Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), passed in February 1999, recognized the need to address the risks associated with nuclear weapons and emphasized the importance of CBMs and arms control agreements.³ Since the presence of nuclear weapons increased the risks of escalation and crisis instability between the two countries,⁴ the MoU aimed to address these risks and promote stability by establishing measures to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and reduce the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. The agreement also aimed to promote arms control and disarmament measures to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The 1999 Kargil Crisis and the 2001-2002 standoff between India and Pakistan highlighted the weakness of the Lahore MoU and prolonged a stalemate in NCBM negotiations. Eventually, both states agreed to resume the dialogue and launched a composite dialogue process in 2004 that led to the negotiation of three NCBMs.⁵ Overall, both states have agreed to four NCBMs over the last 40 years (see Table 1). The first—the 1988 Nuclear Non-Attack Agreement—predates the countries’ overt nuclearization by a decade. As of 2024, it has been 17 years since the last NCBM agreement⁶ and a decade since the last nuclear dialogue.⁷
At first glance, it appears that NCBMs have endured and met their initial objectives. After all, Islamabad and New Delhi share lists of nuclear facilities as per the 1988 Non-Attack Agreement like clockwork on January 1 each year,⁸ a practice they have continued for three decades without fail. Both states usually notify each other of their ballistic missile tests and issue the customary notice to airmen.⁹ As there have been no accidents involving nuclear weapons in either country, the 2007 agreement remains untested in real-life situations. Finally, the hotline provides direct communication between foreign secretaries for resolving misunderstandings, even though it is yet to be used in a crisis.
In order to critically analyze the NCBM regime between Pakistan and India, I have developed a framework that analyzes implementation of the NCBMs against nine parameters (Table 2; see Annex A for definitions).¹⁰ The objective of selecting these parameters is to ensure that this research has empirical validity, policy relevance, and case-study applicability.¹¹
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Scope as a parameter refers to the breadth and depth of the NCBMs’ applicability, encompassing the particular problems, fields, or operations that these measures address.¹² The scopes of the 1988, 2004, 2005, and 2007 NCBMs are all quite narrow. For example, the lists of nuclear facilities shared by New Delhi and Islamabad do not include newly constructed nuclear facilities.¹³ According to Antoine Levesques et al., “As the lists seldom change and are assumed not to include all possible targets of concern (especially those related to nuclear weapons), this agreement is now largely symbolic, but it is not insignificant that both parties have adhered to the exchange stipulation every year regardless of the state of bilateral relations.”¹⁴ Other studies have highlighted that these lists are incomplete and partial.¹⁵ These arguments also relate to the parameter of transparency, which is an assessment of the level of accessibility and openness of data,¹⁶ and depict that it needs to be strengthened.
Unclear definitions limit the clarity in scope of NCBMs. For example, the 1988 agreement defines “nuclear installation or facility” but gives a vague delineation of the word “attack,” which is only used in the title of the agreement and is not mentioned in the preamble or operating paragraphs. Instead, the agreement describes the manifestation of an attack as “any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility.”¹⁷ On one hand, this choice of words can be interpreted as broad enough to include armed attacks, sabotage, terrorism, and even state-sponsored cyber-attacks (even though this was not the original intent or objective of the agreement).¹⁸ Conversely, the lack of explicit language can lead to inconsistent interpretations, disagreements, and possibly exploitation. This is significant in the face of the increasing threat of cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities.
In the case of the 2005 agreement, the scope is limited to ballistic missiles. The omission of cruise missiles leaves “the dangers of misinterpretation of cruise missile launches and deployments unaddressed.”¹⁹ The 2022 Brahmos missile misfire incident was the “first inadvertent launch of a cruise or ballistic missile by one nuclear power unto the territory of another nuclear power,”²⁰ and underscored the need to include cruise missiles in the agreement. Pakistan could have been more prepared to respond to the accident if the 2005 agreement had required prenotification of cruise missile tests. While the addition of cruise missile prenotification could not have prevented this accidental launch, prenotification would have better allowed Pakistan to anticipate the missile test and prepare for an eventuality or contingency in case the missile veered off course and crossed the border into its territory. Minimizing misinterpretation and misperception risks and establishing trust and expectations through missile test prenotification become even more important during crisis or periods of heightened tensions. Advanced notice of missile tests in times of crisis can prevent accidental nuclear war by reducing the risk of misinterpretation, making all the difference.
The 2007 agreement did not include accidents involving nuclear and radioactive materials in the peaceful nuclear programs of the two countries. Yet such incidents can lead to transboundary contamination and should ideally be covered in the agreement. This relates to the parameter of monitoring, which is crucial for ensuring compliance and the effectiveness of NCBMs, and involves implementing mechanisms to verify adherence to agreed-upon measures.²¹ (However, monitoring provisions are not necessary for all NCBMs, including the hotline.) Monitoring provisions would entail more transparency, sharing of information, and bilateral verification arrangements, but considering India and Pakistan’s past track record, “it is unlikely that either of the two countries would agree to a verification regime unless there is a significant change in thinking at the political leadership levels.”²²
Regularity refers to the consistent and predictable implementation of NCBMs over an extended period of time.²³ This parameter evaluates the frequency and dependability with which these measures are implemented. While there is regularity in the implementation of the 1988 agreement, as the lists have been consistently shared annually for 33 years,²⁴ the same cannot be observed in the case of other agreements. Conflicting views exist regarding the notification of short-range ballistic missile incidents. With no reported nuclear weapon accidents, the 2007 agreement’s effectiveness remains untested. Similarly, the hotline could have been utilized to alleviate concerns on several occasions but was not used. Although the situation did not escalate into a crisis, the fact that the Indian Foreign Secretary failed to call his Pakistani counterpart on March 9, 2022, to inform him of the missile misfire and ease tensions was significant. It was a missed opportunity to establish communication and build trust. It could have also refuted the argument that the missile firing was intentional. The missile misfire occurred during peacetime. A similar incident during a time of heightened tension or crisis could have severe consequences.
India-Pakistan NCBMs do not fare well in the three interrelated parameters²⁵ of irreversibility, follow-through, and diffused reciprocity. Irreversibility—commitments that are difficult to reverse or walk back once implemented²⁶—is not reflected in these NCBMs. For example, both states can theoretically refuse to share the lists of nuclear facilities or stop the advance notification of ballistic missile tests. Irreversible agreements create enduring restraints and require confidence that both sides will follow through on their ends of the deal. Follow-through means respecting the letter and spirit of the NCBM by executing the actions and fulfilling the commitments without causing delays. This builds trust in an adversary’s intentions and dispels fear about reversible concessions. The incomplete lists of nuclear facilities, the omission by India to not issue an advance notification for its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and the lack of advance notifications for short-range (tactical) ballistic missiles by both Pakistan and India, are indicative of gaps in follow-through and implementation of the NCBMs. Consequentially, the parameter of diffused reciprocity, which offers mutual benefits and security gains to both states rather than one-sided concessions, is not achieved. Diffused reciprocity incentivizes cooperation and leads to the achievement of further agreements. For example, the 2005 agreement could have led to either an amendment in scope by the inclusion of cruise missiles or a new agreement on the advance notification of cruise missile tests. Follow-through and resultant diffused reciprocity by good implementation of the previous agreement could have paved the way for a new agreement.
NCBMs are designed to reduce nuclear risks by enhancing transparency, communication, and trust between nuclear-armed states, thereby decreasing the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Bilateral NCBMs promote dialogue and cooperation, contributing to stability and security in the international system. However, their impact on enhancing strategic stability, crisis prevention, and escalation management remains limited, as crises and military standoffs continue to occur despite these measures. Nevertheless, advanced notification of ballistic-missile tests has increased predictability to some extent. India and Pakistan had negotiated their 2005 agreement with “the objective of enhancing mutual confidence and engendering predictability and transparency of intent.”²⁷ Missile tests during crisis situations emphasize the determination to deter the adversary, while advance notification gives an uneasy yet necessary assurance that the other side is still complying with its obligations and is not unraveling the situation.
It is possible that the expectation of predictability contributed to a sense of resentment in Pakistan when India conducted an SLBM test in 2016 without prior notification to Pakistan. Adil Sultan argues, “Selective application and interpretation of these arrangements would render it meaningless and could create more distrust between the regional adversaries.”²⁸ Prior to the 2005 agreement, missile tests were viewed with suspicion and alarm. For example, during the 2001-2002 military standoff, Pakistan responded to India’s deployment of Three Strike Corps in Rajasthan by conducting tests of Ghaznavi, Abdali, and Ghauri missiles in quick succession. This caused alarms not only in India but also sparked intense diplomatic activity in Western capitals.²⁹ Since then, both states have not conducted tests after events like the 2008 Mumbai attacks or the 2019 Balakot crisis.³⁰ While it would be an overstatement to infer that a sobering effect of the advance notification agreement is that missile tests previously used for crisis signaling are not being used in that role, both states have learned to tread cautiously with nuclear signaling during crises.³¹
The most crucial NCBM during a crisis, however, is the Foreign Secretaries’ hotline. Ironically, it has not been used in any of the India-Pakistan crises as far as we know.³² The lack of communication and the absence of expert-level dialogue on nuclear issues between the two countries for more than a decade are not promising signs for nuclear risk reduction in South Asia. A dialogue process is essential to understand the other side’s position, assess the adversary, and avoid destabilizing policies. Intelligence misjudgments in South Asia have led to unexpected outcomes in the past, including conflicts. Misperceptions between India and Pakistan have grown, fueled by misunderstandings about each other’s intentions, which may exacerbate the risk of escalation.³³
These NCBMs have not prevented crises or led to any substantive nuclear arms control agreements. The 1988 Non-Attack Agreement was crucial for risk reduction prior to the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan. Both sides were concerned about targeting of their nuclear facilities during a crisis or conflict.³⁴ Pakistan, more so than India, was apprehensive of a surprise attack on its nuclear facilities.³⁵ This agreement “in theory helped allay concerns that nuclear facilities could be attacked purposefully.”³⁶ Annual sharing of lists of nuclear installations and facilities suggests that it is “the most enduring” NCBM between India and Pakistan; however, “the banality of this exchange suggests that the agreement has little practical contemporary meaning for peace and security in the region.”³⁷ Manpreet Sethi has argued that this is the “only Indo-Pak agreement not yet violated,” and concludes that despite the annual sharing of lists, the “overall atmosphere, however, is still one of low trust and confidence.”³⁸
The breakdown of the dialogue process between Pakistan and India generally, and communication in crucial times specifically, is indicative of seven concerning trends in the Pakistan-India bilateral relationship and their NCBMs regime. First, smooth implementation of existing NCBMs will not be possible if one or both states do not see value in the trust-building and transparency-enhancing character of these measures. Second, deteriorated dialogue and communication make it easier for both states to gradually move from a diluted commitment to bilateral obligations to a complacency in compliance to, ultimately, a complete abrogation of the agreements, particularly as all the existing NCBMs are easily reversible with little consequences for either state. Third, the breakdown in dialogue will increasingly become a challenge for states to follow through to negotiate and agree to new NCBMs. Fourth, none of the existing NCBMs have a monitoring and verification regime, and it does not appear likely in the short-term that both states will institute a verification regime for NCBMs, despite the obvious benefits for confidence and trust-building. For two states with high levels of distrust, it is ironic that India and Pakistan simply take each other’s word for compliance with bilateral obligations. Fifth, the absence of a structured process for review of implementation of the NCBMs regime implies that both states are unable to identify shortcomings in the regime and to make necessary adjustments. They are also more likely to miss opportunities to improve or expand measures to address evolving security concerns.
Sixth, the fragmented and less-than-satisfactory implementation of existing NCBMs has not created diffused reciprocity between the two states. It has become increasingly difficult for India and Pakistan to achieve a place in their bilateral relationship where one state’s conciliatory actions or concessions toward another state are met with similar actions or concessions in return. And seventh, the stalled diplomacy resulting from the lack of dialogue between these two nuclear-armed adversaries could give rise to increased misinterpretations and misperceptions. Suspicions and animosity would continue to simmer in such a political environment, feeding into tendencies to strengthen cognitive biases against the other, and weakening the willingness to show appeasement.
India and Pakistan need nuclear arms control. There are three main forms of arms control that the two states may opt for:
A comprehensive arms control strategy for India and Pakistan should incorporate all three forms of arms control, which help maintain credible deterrence, fulfill nonproliferation responsibilities as nuclear powers, and mitigate escalation dangers in their complex strategic relationship. While progress may be slow as a result of historical baggage, this multilayered approach can restrain an uncontrolled arms race, account for deterrence requirements, and manage crisis escalation risks in the region. Incremental, verifiable concessions between adversaries can catalyze reciprocity and build cooperative habits.³⁹ Confidence-building puts forward step-by-step measures that demonstrate concessions and cooperative intentions, which in turn can positively shape threat perceptions. In view of this argument, it would be prudent that India and Pakistan take initial steps for arms control to enhance stability and then proceed to more substantive arms control.
To progress toward nuclear arms control, it is essential for both states to engage in sustained nuclear dialogue, improve the implementation of existing NCBMs, and enhance their scope and obligations. Additionally, negotiating new NCBMs can facilitate a more conducive environment for comprehensive and substantive arms control measures. Some key areas in which India and Pakistan can progress are:
This paper offers three policy recommendations for how India and Pakistan can create and implement NCBMs.
Pakistan and India should resume bilateral dialogue that is focused on NCBMs, actively avoids contentious political issues, and prioritizes maintaining channels of communication on nuclear issues. During the composite dialogue process, both states were able to agree to three NCBMs in four years, demonstrating that dialogue can help ease tensions and reduce nuclear risks. Negotiating agreements based on existing practices acknowledges this shared interest and provides a foundation for cooperative risk reduction. Pakistan’s 2012 proposals—which focused on the exchange of information and experience on nuclear safety, the exchange of information on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and an agreement on the early notification of nuclear-related emergencies—are good starting points for the two states. While India expressed a preference for working through existing multilateral treaty mechanisms, this remains a useful point of discussion with the potential for further progress.⁴⁰
Pakistan and India should have a review mechanism in place to review the implementation of existing NCBMs and make adjustments as challenges arise or opportunities appear. By periodically assessing and adapting NCBMs, both countries can account for changes in technology, capabilities, and threats, and address emerging challenges. The existence of a review mechanism itself can contribute to confidence-building. By demonstrating a commitment to transparency and a willingness to evaluate and adjust their NCBMs, Pakistan and India can enhance mutual trust because CBMs gain credibility when both parties believe in their effectiveness.
Pakistan and India need to improve their crisis communication practices and actually use the existing hotlines between senior civilian and military officials. Direct communication between stakeholders can enable the conveyance of resolve, clarify misperceptions, and mitigate escalatory actions. This would help avoid miscalculations and enable off-ramps during future nuclear crises, bolstering strategic stability. Both states could also develop standardized crisis-response protocols outlining the procedures, responsibilities, and decision-making processes during a crisis. They could also regularly conduct joint crisis-management exercises to familiarize officials with these protocols and ensure seamless coordination. Encryption of the existing hotlines between the two countries is also crucial for enhancing communication security. This could also lead to technical cooperation which would broadly build confidence in crisis management and augment the utility and resilience of direct nuclear communication channels.
It is in both countries’ interests to avoid nuclear war, and the only way to do that is for both to focus and invest in NCBMs.
Scope means the range and extent of coverage or applicability of the NCBMs as well as the issues covered by NCBMs. It encompasses the specific issues, areas, or activities addressed by these measures.⁴¹
Regularity is the consistent and predictable implementation or execution of NCBMs over time. It assesses how frequently and reliably these measures are put into practice.⁴²
Transparency involves the openness and accessibility of information regarding the implementation of NCBMs. It evaluates the degree to which relevant information is readily available to all concerned parties as well as the public.⁴³
Communication refers to the exchange of information and messages between involved parties related to NCBMs. It includes both formal and informal channels of dialogue and information-sharing.⁴⁴
Monitoring entails oversight of NCBMs to ensure compliance and effectiveness. It involves mechanisms for verifying that the agreed-upon measures are being followed.⁴⁵
Irreversibility examines the enduring impact of these measures and is the degree to which actions or commitments resulting from NCBMs cannot be easily undone or reversed.⁴⁶
Follow-through implies the extent to which parties involved in NCBMs adhere to their commitments and responsibilities, especially after the initial agreements have been made.⁴⁷
Diffused reciprocity denotes the mutual cooperation and reciprocal actions by states within the NCBM framework. It examines whether one state’s pacifying actions or concessions toward another state are met with similar actions or concessions in return.⁴⁸
The mechanism to review implementation denotes the structured processes or systems in place to periodically assess and evaluate how well the NCBMs are being implemented. It involves reviewing progress, identifying challenges, and making necessary adjustments.⁴⁹
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