One of the hallmarks of the 1965 India-Pakistan war was the improvisations brought about by the Western Army Commander Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh and General Officer Commanding (GOC) 11 Corps Lt Gen JS Dhillon to deal with emerging operational situations.
Among the many that were implemented, some were very successful like the Bharat Force and Megh Force, while other spur-of-the-moment decisions of the Army Commander had poor results such as the capitulation of 4 Sikh.
As far as the issue of leadership goes, at a macro level, the quick change of a division commander who failed to perform and the immediate sacking of incompetent commanding officers and brigade commanders in the 1965 war is unmatched to date in any other military operation in the country.
While the saga of Megh Force and Lt Col Megh Singh is well known, Bharat Force was the result of a quick decision taken to replace the commanding officer of an armoured regiment. Taking advantage of this change in command, an ad-hoc armoured task force was created which was quite successful but could have yielded even more results with more drive and innovation.
The official history of the war notes that on September 11, 1965, when a major enemy armour and infantry threat was reported developing on the Ranian axis, near Amritsar, 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was moved into the 15 Division sector on the intervening night of September 11 and 12. However, the Brigade moved back to the 4 Mountain Division sector on September 13 after the situation was stabilised.
On September 11, the Commandant of an armoured regiment was replaced by Colonel Bharat Singh after certain orders issued by the Commandant regarding contact with enemy Patton tanks were viewed dimly by senior officers.
Regarding Col Bharat Singh, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh wrote in his book In The Line of Duty, that Colonel Bharat Singh was Colonel A at his headquarters at Simla. He adds that it was the first day of the war when he got a report that the Commandant of an armoured regiment with the 15 Infantry Division “had not been well” and as a result, he had issued an order to his tank regiment in writing, not to take their tanks nearer than 2,000 yards up to the Ichhogil Canal.
The Commandant warned in his orders that the Pakistanis had Patton tanks, which had better range and a better calibre of gun compared to the Shermans which his regiment possessed.
“I intended to replace this officer when Colonel Bharat Singh trooped into my office and volunteered to go and take over the regiment which he had commanded once. I considered his rank of a full Colonel, and also thought of the five AMX tanks (brand new) which had been left behind by the Pakistanis, in their foolish dash over the Dera Baba Nanak bridge. I offered to send him as a Force Commander of the armour in the area of the GT Axis, including 1 Horse and the 5 AMX tanks belonging to the enemy, provided he found the crew for them from 1 Horse. He was to lead his tanks himself right up to the Ichhogil Canal,” writes Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh.
Another impromptu decision taken by the Army Commander was about Brigadier Pritam Singh. Again, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh mentions that the officer was under a cloud and was lined up to be demoted to his substantive rank of Lieutenant Colonel just before the war commenced.
“I was worried about who would replace the Brigadier in charge of Dera Baba Nanak, who during a local exercise had stumbled into one of our own bunkers and broken his back. I recalled my meeting with Pritam Singh at Dera Baba Nanak, way back in the 1950s, when I was Brigadier General Staff Western Command and he was commanding a Guards battalion there,” writes Harbaksh Singh.
“He had at the time explained the layout of the sector of Dera Baba Nanak to me. So, I sent for him and explained that I was willing to keep him in his present rank of Brigadier if he would go and take over the Dera Baba Nanak bridge. He was only too happy to do so. And though he did not particularly distinguish himself there, and retired from the Army as a Brigadier, I had the satisfaction of having helped an acquaintance,” he adds.
In fact at Dera Baba Nanak, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander, Lt Gen JS Dhillon, had to make another impromptu decision to stabilise the situation when faced with a Pakistani push. The Brigade Commander wanted to withdraw from the bundh near the Ravi River and defend at a fresh defensive line on the Dera Baba Nanak-Batala road.
The Corps Commander forbade this retreat and immediately dispatched Chief Engineer 11 Corps Brigadier Bhide and GSO 1 at the Corps HQ Lt Col Chhaju Ram to the brigade headquarters to help tackle the developing battle and retake key positions.
In his other book War Despatches, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh points out the importance of good leadership in war. “The lesson is clear: in war, there can be no substitute for good leadership-the best of plans are doomed to failure without aggressive and enterprising commanders. The retention of the hesitant and cautious in command is an invitation to disaster”.


Man Aman Singh ChhinaMan Aman reports on defence and national security affairs. He also wri… read more

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